>> The first requirement is that the computer program has a body (either physical or virtual) and sense organs
LLMs may be chameleons, but, to steal an excellent quote, if you can’t tell does it really matter.
My personal take on this is that consciousness is a thing induced, not a thing evoked. If it generates a response on the observer as a conscious thing would it is, by my definition, conscious.
Sure, by your definition they totally are conscious simply because at one point in the past they fooled one person that they might be so (and so is the OG chat agent, ELIZA). But no one else will accept such a definition.
And if you read my comment above carefully, I point out at least one way you could tell whether an agent has an I or just pretending to – by tracking their energy expenditure/reaction times. But they would give themselves in other ways as well. Pretending can only fool one short-term.
I'm not going to discuss the quote since @sp1nningaway already pointed out it doesn't say what you say it does.
>> The first requirement is that the computer program has a body (either physical or virtual) and sense organs
LLMs may be chameleons, but, to steal an excellent quote, if you can’t tell does it really matter.
My personal take on this is that consciousness is a thing induced, not a thing evoked. If it generates a response on the observer as a conscious thing would it is, by my definition, conscious.